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REFLECTIONS ON CERTIFICATION, 
INTERPRETATION, AND THE QUEST 
FOR FRAUD THAT “COUNTS” UNDER 
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Joan H. Krause* 
 
 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) is the primary tool used by the 
federal government to stem fraudulently obtained payments. The June 
2016 Supreme Court opinion in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar upheld the applicability of the FCA to a 
defendant who falsely implied that it was in compliance with health 
care licensure and supervision requirements in order to obtain Medi- 
caid payment. In a unanimous opinion, the Justices affirmed the va- 
lidity of this “implied certification” theory but warned that misrepre- 
sentations must meet the demanding standard of being “material” to 
the government’s decision to pay. Without citing to the extensive ap- 
pellate case law, and relying little on the statutory text, the Justices de- 
clined to set bright-line rules, opting instead for a fact-intensive, 
common-sense approach to determining materiality. However, the 
opinion left open many questions regarding the definition of material- 
ity, as well as the issue of which of the vast number of possible mis- 
representations should be encompassed within FCA liability. 
This Article aims to provide guidance regarding the types of 
misrepresentations that should suffice for FCA liability under implied 
certification. Given the sheer number of regulatory requirements ap- 
plicable to the federal health care programs, it is difficult to argue that 
each and every instance of noncompliance should be actionable un- 
der the FCA. Ultimately, while the implied certification theory sur- 
vived Escobar, without more definitive guidance the lower courts will 
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“Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak out and 
remove all doubt.” 
–  Abraham Lincoln1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes, we lie when we speak; sometimes, we lie when we don’t. 
Striking the right balance was the essence of the 2016 Supreme Court 
opinion in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Esco- 
bar,2 which challenged the applicability of the Civil False Claims Act 
(“FCA”)3 to situations in which a defendant falsely implies that it has 
complied with regulatory requirements to obtain government payment.4 
Escobar was brought by the parents of a young woman who died after 
receiving Medicaid-covered mental-health treatment from a Massachu- 
setts clinic that failed to satisfy state licensing and supervision rules. Ar- 
guing that the clinic’s Medicaid claims contained implied representations 
that it was in full compliance with the regulations, the parents alleged 
 
 
1. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (Fred R. Shapiro, ed. 2006) (citations omitted). 
2.  136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
3.     31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
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that those claims were fraudulent under the FCA.5 The district court 
granted the clinic’s motion to dismiss,6 but the First Circuit reversed and 
remanded,7 setting forth a broad implied certification theory at odds with 
decisions in several other Circuits.8 
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the validity of the implied certification theory: in situa- 
tions where a defendant “makes specific representations about the goods 
or services provided, but knowingly fails to disclose . . . noncompliance 
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement[,] . . . liability 
may attach if the omission renders those representations misleading.”9 
Warning that such misrepresentations must meet the “demanding” 
standard of being “material to the Government’s payment decision,” 
however, the Court nonetheless reversed and remanded because the 
First Circuit had applied an impermissibly broad test.10 While both par- 
ties were quick to claim victory, ultimately the decision is likely to satisfy 
no one and to raise as many questions as it answers, particularly with re- 
gard to federal health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Ironically—or perhaps fittingly—for a case that was expected to de- 
fine the contours of fraudulent omissions, the opinion was notable as 
much for what it did not say as for what it did. Without citing to the ex- 
tensive appellate case law on either FCA implied certification or materi- 
ality, and relying little on the statutory text itself, the Justices drew pri- 
marily on common-law concepts.11 They explicitly declined to set bright- 
line rules—refusing, for example, to decide whether the definition of ma- 
teriality contained in a separate section of the FCA should apply to im- 
plied certification as well.12 Instead, the Justices opted for a fact- 
intensive, commonsense approach more reminiscent of Justice Stewart’s 
famous proclamation regarding pornography (“I know it when I see 




6. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. 11-11170-DPW, 2014 WL 
1271757, at *13 (D. Mass., Mar. 26, 2014). 
7. United  States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 508 (1st Cir.  
2015). 
8. E.g., United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the government “pleads a false claim when it alleges that the contractor, with the requi- 
site scienter, made a request for payment under a contract and ‘withheld information about its non- 
compliance with material contractual requirements.’”); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 
696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to adopt the “so-called doctrine of implied false certification”); 
United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that to 
“establish knowledge on the basis of an implied false certification, [Appellant] had to prove that [Ap- 
pellee]…knew both that it violated a legal obligation and that its compliance was a condition of pay- 
ment.”); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that implied certification should 
apply only in limited circumstances). 
9. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995. 
10.    Id. at 1996. 
11.    Id. at 1999. 
12.    Id. at 2002. 
13. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today at- 
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examples, virtually guaranteeing that befuddled litigants would need to 
seek clarity through future litigation. 
This Article seeks to shed light on the fundamental question under- 
lying this litigation: what types of fraud should “count” under the FCA? 
The Supreme Court long ago warned that the FCA “was not designed to 
reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government.”14 Yet, the vi- 
sion of actionable harm emerging from the case law is broad, and the 
Court later noted that the statute reaches “all fraudulent attempts to 
cause the Government to pay out sums of money.”15 The problem arises 
because in the federal health care program context, as long as items or 
services were actually provided, a claim can be considered implicitly false 
or fraudulent only by reference to the voluminous statutes, regulations, 
and contract provisions that govern program participation.16 Given the 
sheer quantity of these requirements, it is difficult to argue that each and 
every instance of noncompliance should create extensive FCA liability.17 
Yet neither the statutory language, nor nearly 150 years of case law, pro- 
vides a coherent mechanism for distinguishing irrelevant noncompliance 
from more significant misrepresentations that go to the heart of what the 
government believes it is buying. 
This Article situates the implied certification debate, and Escobar 
itself, within the historical context of the FCA as applied to the health 
care industry. Part II analyzes the development of implied certification, 
from its roots in traditional government contracting cases to its modern 
revival as a tool to combat health care fraud. Part III addresses a number 
of issues left open—or raised for the first time—by the Escobar opinion, 
including: 1) whether there is a coherent test for implied certification; 2) 
when a misrepresentation is considered to be material; 3) which elements 
of the FCA are subject to a materiality analysis; 4) the vantage point 
from which materiality should be assessed; 5) the timing of the materiali- 
ty assessment; and 6) the practical impact of these debates, particularly 
on the pressure to settle. Ultimately, Escobar represents a lost oppor- 
tunity to confront the challenges posed by implied certification, a failing 







scription [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
14. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958). 
15. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968). 
16. Id. 
17. Indeed, one court recently estimated that the Code of Federal Regulations sections govern- 
ing the federal health care programs comprise over 175,000 pages, and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) website contains more than 37,000 guidance documents. See Caring 
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II. DIMENSIONS OF FALSITY AND FRAUD UNDER THE FCA 
Implied certification did not spring full-blown, Athena-like,   from 
the brow of the First Circuit. While the term may be of recent vintage, 
the theory is based on a longstanding line of cases applying the FCA to 
defendants who falsely claim entitlement to government benefits. To ap- 
preciate that context, it is important to understand how these FCA theo- 
ries first developed. 
 
A. The FCA 
It may be surprising to recognize that today’s powerful FCA provi- 
sions are rooted in the Civil War, when the “Informer’s Act” was passed 
to prohibit what would now be considered rather mundane forms of 
fraud against the Union Army: selling sick mules to Union troops, for 
example, or substituting sand for gunpowder.18 The Act has been amend- 
ed several times, but the focus remains on falsely demanding (or retain- 
ing) payment from the government. The basic false claims provision, cur- 
rently found in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), prohibits defendants from 
knowingly presenting, or causing to be presented, “a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval”; the accompanying false rec- 
ords/statements prohibition in § 3729(a)(1)(B) applies when the defend- 
ant “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record 
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”19 Among other 
things, the law also prohibits conspiracies, and “reverse” false claims that 
understate a defendant’s obligation to (re)pay the government.20 
“Knowledge” under the FCA includes not just actual knowledge, 
but also deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of falsity.21 Since the 
1990s, FCA violations have been subject to civil penalties of $55,000 to 
$11,000 per claim plus three times the government’s damages; under a 
provision of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, however, penalties as- 
sessed after August 1, 2016, rose to between $10,781 and $21,563 per 
claim.22 Combined with the threat of exclusion from federal health care 
 
 
18. The original legislation was enacted as the Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. See gener- 
ally S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273; Joan H. Krause, 
Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 129 (2001). 
19.    31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
20. Id. §§ 3729(a)(1)(C)–(G). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) 
made several substantive changes to the FCA, adding the false records materiality requirement, 
broadening the definition of a claim, expanding the conspiracy prohibition, and applying reverse false 
claims liability to the retention of overpayments. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) further clarified the relationship between the FCA and 
payments made in connection with the new Health Care Exchanges, and provided that the knowing 
retention of an overpayment for more than sixty days after identification may be a reverse false claim. 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§1313(a)(6) & 6402(a), 124 Stat. 119, 185, 753 (2010). 
21.   31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2012). 
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programs, these massive penalties are the key reason health care provid- 
ers often settle rather than defend against FCA allegations in court. 
The broad reach of the FCA is due in part to the law’s qui tam pro- 
vision, which permits a private person (“relator”) to sue on the govern- 
ment’s behalf in return for a portion of any proceeds—15–25% if the 
government intervenes, 25–30% if not.23 After amendments in 1986 mod- 
ernized the Act and made it more lucrative to pursue qui tam actions, the 
number of health care-related FCA suits grew exponentially: two-thirds    
of the qui tam suits filed in 2015 raised allegations of fraud in the federal 
health care programs, compared to only 10% in 1987.24 The qui tam 
mechanism ensures that FCA cases will be filed by a wide range of indi- 
viduals and entities other than federal prosecutors,  including  competi-  
tors, employees, and patients or their representatives (such as Yarushka 
Rivera’s parents). 
 
B. Dimensions of Falsity and Fraud 
While the FCA contains no definition of the terms “false or fraudu- 
lent,” the Supreme Court has held, both in Escobar and previous cases, 
that the statute incorporates common-law concepts of fraud.25 Historical- 
ly, most health care FCA cases involved straightforward, “factually false” 
claims requesting payment for more expensive categories of care than 
were delivered or for services that were never provided.26 Over time, 
both federal prosecutors and qui tam relators began to invoke the law 
against “legally false” claims as well, where items or services were pro- 
vided but the claimant had also violated an underlying legal require- 
ment.27 Under this theory, it is the defendant’s untruthful certification of 
compliance with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision—rather 
than a misrepresentation about the item or service itself—that establish- 




23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). The intervention decision may be lengthy. See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 210 F.R.D. 257, 258 n.3 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]his action was filed in 
1996 and the government has still not decided whether to intervene. Molasses moves more quickly.”). 
24. See DOJ, FRAUD STATISTICS: OVERVIEW (Nov. 23, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/file/796866/download. For an empirical analysis of qui tam litigation, see generally David 
Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1913 (2014); David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical 
Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 
(2013) [hereinafter Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private  Enforcement]. 
25. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) 
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999)). For an argument situating the FCA within con- 
tract theory, see Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied Certification Under the False Claims Act, 41 
PUB. Cont. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that the FCA “is designed to enable the Government to contract 
for information about performance—information for which the Government has a special need”). 
26. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Ctr., Inc., 543  F.3d  1211, 
1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing “a run-of-the-mill ‘factually false’ case”); United States v. Krizek, 859 
F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1994) (alleging that psychiatrist billed for more extensive—and more expensive— 
types of therapy than he provided). 
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sity theory to file qui tam suits based on violations of a myriad of legal 
provisions that do not themselves provide private rights of action.28 
The federal courts have recognized two distinct theories of legal fal- 
sity. Express certification applies when a defendant makes an explicitly 
false certification of compliance with an underlying program condition, 
such as by signing a false certification statement on an invoice.29 In the 
absence of an explicit misrepresentation, some courts have been willing 
to imply that claims for government payment contain similar, unstated 
assurances of compliance.30 Under this theory of implied certification, the 
“act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance 
with governing federal rules.”31 Where express certification is by defini- 
tion limited to those provisions with which a defendant must affirmative- 
ly certify compliance before being paid, implied certification extends to 
the defendant’s silence regarding a failure to comply with thousands of 
additional program conditions that are not reflected in any explicit com- 
pliance statement. 
The roots of implied certification can be found in a longstanding 
line of cases applying the FCA to defendants who made false representa- 
tions in order to secure government contracts. Often characterized as 
“false negotiation” or “fraud-in-the-inducement,” the theory posits that 
an initial falsity can taint subsequent claims for payment, even if those 
claims are for legitimate goods or services.32 The tainted-claims theory, in 
turn, evolved from bid-rigging cases, where it was feared that collusion 
might produce artificially high or low bids that would fraudulently entitle 
the winning bidder to a future stream of government revenue.33 This the- 
ory soon was extended to situations such as the submission of false price 
or cost information in connection with securing a government contract, 
misrepresentations regarding an applicant’s ability to perform the con- 
tract terms, and misrepresentations of eligibility for restricted govern- 
ment programs.34 Indeed, the Senate sponsors of the 1986 FCA amend- 
ments were clear that “each and every claim submitted under a contract, 
 
28. See Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims 
Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1392–1409 (2002) [hereinafter Krause, "Promises to Keep"]. 
29. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217–18. An explicitly false representation of compliance, such as a 
false certification on a claim form, should be considered a false record/statement under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
30. See Krause, “Promises to Keep,” supra note 28, at 1377. 
31. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016) (“According to this theory, when a defend- 
ant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance with all conditions of payment. But if that claim 
fails to disclose the defendant’s violation of a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual require- 
ment, so the theory goes, the defendant has made a misrepresentation that renders the claim ‘false or 
fraudulent’ under § 3729(a)(1)(A).”). 
32. Krause, “Promises to Keep,” supra note 28, at 1373–76. See generally Dayna Bowen Mat- 
thew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting Medical 
Fraud Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525 (2001). 
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1943) (alleging collusive 
bidding). 
34. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 499–500 (8th Cir. 
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loan guarantee, or other agreement which was originally obtained by 
means of false statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct . . . con- 
stitutes a false claim.”35 
Implied certification developed as an offshoot of fraudulent in- 
ducement focusing specifically on false representations of eligibility for 
government programs.36 The clearest example occurs when a defendant 
untruthfully represents that it has satisfied initial eligibility criteria; it is  
but a small step, however, to extend the theory to an implied promise of 
continued compliance with program requirements as  well.  The  major  
case in this area was the 1994 decision in Ab-Tech Construction Inc. v. 
United States, in which the Court of Federal Claims awarded the gov- 
ernment statutory penalties against a minority-owned small business that 
had failed to obtain Small Business Association approval to engage in 
business with a nonminority-owned subcontractor.37 Finding the defend- 
ant’s subsequent claims to be false, the court stated that “[t]he payment 
vouchers represented an implied certification by Ab-Tech of its continu-   
ing adherence to the requirements for participation in the program.”38 By 
reading an implied certification into all of the claims submitted, the Ab- 
Tech Court linked the defendant’s regulatory compliance to its continued 
program eligibility—simultaneously grounding the decision in FCA 
precedent while opening the door that led, twenty years later, to Esco-   
bar. 
The evolution in health care fraud cases resembled that in govern- 
ment contracting. The first regulatory targets were physician-anti-referral 
restrictions, followed by quality-of-care requirements.39 In the early 
1990s, qui tam relators brought a spate of tainted claims suits based on 
allegations that health care providers had violated anti-referral provi- 
sions (such as the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and 
“Stark Law” self-referral prohibition) in connection with services cov- 
ered for by Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care pro- 
grams.40 As in Ab-Tech, this alleged fraud arose during the provision of 
 
35. S. REP. NO. 99–345, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274. 
36.  Indeed, the theories are so close that commentators at times disagree as to whether they can 
be distinguished at all. Compare Krause, “Promises to Keep,” supra note 28, at 1375 n.51 (arguing that 
“it is preferable to treat misrepresentations used to gain initial entitlement to a government program 
as tainted claims, reserving the false certification category for cases involving misrepresentations made 
to obtain subsequent payment”), with JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 
(4th ed., 2016) (CCH) § 1.6 (including with false certifications those situations in which “parties avail 
themselves of benefits of some type, such as loan guarantees or agricultural supports, through false 
statements that create eligibility where otherwise it would not exist.”). 
37. 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 435 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
38. Id. at 434 (emphasis added); see also id. (“In short, the Government was duped by Ab-Tech’s 
active concealment of a fact vital to the integrity of that program. The withholding of such infor- 
mation—information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false claim.”). 
39. See Krause, “Promises to Keep,” supra note 28, at 1391–1406. 
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (Anti-Kickback Statute), 1395nn (Ethics in Patient Referrals 
Act, i.e., the “Stark Law,” nicknamed for its sponsor Rep. Fortney “Pete” Stark); see, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. Supp. 1504, 1506–07 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (relator “could produce 
evidence that would show that the kickbacks allegedly paid to the defendant physicians somehow 
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services, rather than in the initial application to join the programs: 
“[u]nder this new theory of liability, the [] anti-kickback allegation ren- 
ders a subsequent Medicare claim ‘false’ no matter how medically neces- 
sary and competently administered the services were, or how bona fide 
the claim for payment actually is.”41 While at first received favorably by 
courts, the theory soon foundered as applied to the Anti-Kickback Stat- 
ute because it was unclear whether services provided in violation of the 
statute automatically were ineligible for payment.42 
Rather than relying on the argument that regulatory violations per 
se tainted subsequent claims, other relators began to invoke implied cer- 
tification, alleging that claims “were nonetheless fraudulent because by 
submitting the claims, Defendants implicitly certified that they had com- 
plied with all statutes, rules, and regulations governing the Medicare Act, 
including federal anti-kickback and self-referral statutes.”43 With Ab- 
Tech as a model, these cases also generated some initial success; even 
while questioning the tainted claims approach, the Fifth Circuit approved 
of express certification in cases where “the government has conditioned 
payment of a claim upon certification of compliance.”44 As with tainted 
claims, however, certification cases alleging Anti-Kickback violations 
had to confront the question of whether compliance with the statute truly 
was a precondition to payment.45 
By the late 1990s, relators and federal prosecutors had begun to ex- 
tend implied certification beyond the anti-referral context to reach 
broader allegations of substandard care. Quality-of-care cases are attrac- 
tive because of the wide variety of quality-related requirements applica- 
ble to the federal health care programs, ranging from staffing ratios in 
nursing homes to detailed laboratory and equipment testing standards. 
Moreover, as a litigation strategy, it is far more compelling to depict pa- 
tients—rather than a faceless bureaucratic agency—as victims of the 
fraud. Many of these quality provisions are “conditions of participation,” 
 
41. Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting the Use of Alleged 
Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1998) 
(internal citations omitted). 
42. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902  
(5th Cir. 1997). At that time, the Anti-Kickback Statute differed markedly from the Stark Law in this 
respect: while the Anti-Kickback Statute required proof of mens rea and did not list denial of payment    
as a potential penalty, the Stark Law was a strict liability statute under which violations explicitly were 
subject to payment denial or refund. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (Anti-Kickback Statute), with  
id. § 1395nn(g)(1)–(2) (Stark Law penalties). See generally John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why 
Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L.     
REV. 1 (1999). The Affordable Care Act closed this loophole, clarifying that a claim resulting from a 
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute “constitutes a false or fraudulent claim” under the FCA. 42   
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012). 
43. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1509 (M.D. Tenn. 
1996). 
44. Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902. 
45. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 
1041–42 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (relying, on remand, on affidavit from Medicare official stating that payment 
was dependent on truthful completion of compliance statement on Cost Report); Krause, “Promises to 
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meaning that providers will need to bring themselves back into compli- 
ance if they want to continue to be paid for treating federal health care 
program patients.46 Rather than nonpayment, however, most violations 
are subject to a set of graduated administrative sanctions, such as a cor- 
rective action plan or payment of civil monetary penalties.47 Particularly 
where disputes concern technical quality standards, courts have been re- 
luctant to allow FCA implied certification allegations to proceed.48 In 
contrast, cases alleging systemic quality-of-care violations, such as perva- 
sive understaffing or unsafe facilities, have had better success.49 For many 
courts, the distinguishing factor has remained the same as in the govern- 
ment contracting context: whether compliance with the statute or regula- 
tion is a condition for payment of the claim.50 As the cases progressed, 
however, that criterion would prove both elusive and controversial. 
 
C. Pre-Escobar Approaches to Implied  Certification 
Twenty years after Ab-Tech, it was clear that in many Circuits im- 
plied certification was a viable theory extending FCA liability from mis- 
representations about initial eligibility to implied promises of continued 
compliance with program criteria.51 The question, of course, was which 
program requirements: the totality of all regulations applying to the rele- 
vant federal program, including those that subjected the defendant only 
to administrative sanctions, or only those where “adherence to the statu- 
tory or regulatory mandate lies at the core of [the] agreement with the 
Government?”52 In short, what types of noncompliance were important 
enough to “count” under the FCA? 
In general, the courts adopting implied certification have taken one 
of two broad approaches to defining the universe of actionable viola- 
tions. The Second Circuit, in an oft-cited 2001 opinion, limited  implied 
 
46. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pt. 482 (2016) (listing conditions of participation for hospitals). 
47.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.406 (2016). 
48. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699–701 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting allegations that 
claims submitted after defendants failed to calibrate spirometry equipment in accordance with one 
particular set of standards violated the FCA). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (W.D. Mo. 
2000) (alleging that a nursing home was “so severely understaffed that it could not have possibly” pro- 
vided the required care); United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485 
(W.D. Okla. 1996) (alleging that psychiatric hospital had failed to provide a “reasonably safe” envi- 
ronment for patients). These cases may be successful, in part, because they go beyond certification and 
tainted claims to allege basic violations of the FCA: billing for a level of services that were not provid- 
ed, and realistically could not have been. See Krause, “Promises to Keep,” supra note 28, at 1404–05. 
50. See, e.g., Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (limiting implied certification to situations in which compli- 
ance expressly is required as a condition of payment). 
51. Prior to Escobar, only the Seventh Circuit had expressly declined to recognize the theory. 
United States v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Universal Health 
Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998–99 (2016) (recognizing Seventh Cir- 
cuit’s rejection). 
52. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 84 F. Supp. 2d 427, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Mon- 
ica P. Navarro, Materiality: A Needed Return to Basics in False Claims Act Liability, 43 U. MEM. L.  
REV. 105, 110 (2012) (“[T]he factual or legal falsity must pertain to something that is important to or  
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certification to violations of statutes or regulations clearly identified as 
express conditions of payment.53 At the other end of the spectrum, the 
First Circuit in Escobar focused instead on the materiality of the misrep- 
resentation to the payment decision, regardless of whether compliance 
was expressly required for payment.54 To add to the confusion, courts of- 
ten have referred to the two approaches using similar language; indeed, 
the distinctions appear so intertwined and interdependent, and are at 
times interpreted in ways so circular, so as to nearly collapse.55 Yet the 
theories differ dramatically, both in theory and in function. The confu- 
sion reached the breaking point in 2015, with no fewer than four major 
federal appellate courts considering the validity of implied certification, 
setting up the showdown in Escobar.56 
 
1. Preconditions to Payment 
Recognizing that government programs such as Medicare and Med- 
icaid impose thousands of conditions on participants, some mission- 
critical and others merely clerical, the Second Circuit in United States ex 
rel. Mikes v. Straus adopted a widely cited rule limiting implied certifica- 
tion to violations of requirements that are clear prerequisites to govern- 
ment payment: “[l]iability under the Act may properly be found there- 
fore when a defendant submits a claim for reimbursement while 
knowing . . . that payment expressly is precluded because of some non- 
compliance by the defendant.”57 The Mikes approach has been described 
 
53.  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. 
54. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 512–13 (1st Cir. 
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
55. See, e.g., Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 22–23, 30–32 (describing an alternate “certification- 
condition” approach, used by some courts, that appears to conflate the express and implied certifica- 
tion theories). Cf. John T. Boese, The Past, Present, and Future of “Materiality” Under the False Claims 
Act, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 291, 305 (2010) (arguing that, regardless of the standard, 
“[m]ost rational courts are not going to allow a miscarriage of justice.”). 
56. See, e.g., Escobar, 780 F.3d at 512 (adopting “material precondition of payment” approach); 
United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying theory to 
the knowing failure to comply with a material contractual requirement); United States v. Sanford- 
Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting theory entirely as applied to “the thousands of 
pages of federal statutes and regulations incorporated by reference into [certain participation agree- 
ments]”); United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(explicitly limiting theory to compliance with clear conditions of payment). Soon after deciding Esco- 
bar, the Court also remanded Triple Canopy and Sanford-Brown for further proceedings, along with 
another 2015 case construing materiality in the context of fraudulent inducement. See United States ex 
rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198, 1204 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 
2505 (2016); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016) (granting cert. 
and vacating judgment); Triple Canopy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Badr, 136 S. Ct. 2504, 2504 (2016) 
(granting cert. and vacating judgment). Subsequently, the appellate courts have affirmed the original 
decisions in all four cases. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 
2017); United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2016); United States ex rel. Miller v. 
Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 508 (8th Cir. 2016). 
57. Mikes, 274 F.2d at 700; see also Susan C. Levy et al., The Implied Certification Theory: When 
Should the False Claims Act Reach Statements Never Spoken or Communicated, But Only Implied?, 38 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 131, 147–49 (2008) (arguing that requirement must be found in a binding law or regu- 
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as a “compliance-condition rule,”58 a “condition precedent to payment,”59 
and a “precondition to payment” approach.60 Regardless of the moniker, 
the import is clear: before imposing liability, the court must find that 
payment of the claim was contingent on the defendant’s compliance with 
the underlying provision. 
Two aspects of these payment-contingent cases are notable. First, 
before Escobar ultimately rejected the requirement,61 the Mikes ap- 
proach demanded not only that the violation be a de facto condition of 
payment, but also that the relationship be spelled out explicitly in the 
underlying law or regulations: “implied false certification is appropriately 
applied only when the underlying statute or regulations upon which the 
plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to be 
paid.”62 The Mikes court grounded its analysis in federalism, concerned 
that permitting qui tam actions based on alleged violations of broad and 
vague medical standards “would promote federalization of medical mal- 
practice, as the federal government or the qui tam relators would replace 
the aggrieved patient as plaintiff,” and warning that “the courts are not 
the best forum to resolve medical issues concerning levels of care.”63 The 
Mikes approach would stand in marked contrast to those decisions focus- 
ing instead on materiality, which ultimately prevailed in Escobar. 
Second, conditions of payment are distinct from the conditions of 
participation mentioned above, which set out criteria governing partici- 
pation in federal programs.64 Although there are similarities to the tradi- 
tional false negotiation or fraud-in-the-inducement theories, conditions 
of participation usually focus on the continuing eligibility of a provider 
who did not enter the program under false pretenses. The hallmark of a 
condition of participation is that violations are subject to a series of esca- 
 
58. Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 22. 
59. Rob Sneckenberg, The Importance of a Condition Precedent to Payment Requirement for 
Implied Certification Liability Under the Civil False Claims Act, J. CONT. MGMT., Summer 2012, at 76. 
60. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Dacin, Legal Materiality and the Implied Certification Theory of the 
False Claims Act: Why Courts Have Rejected the Traditional Standards of Materiality in Favor of a Pre- 
condition to Payment Requirement, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 31, 33 (2012). Dacin describes the key 
inquiry as “whether the government could use noncompliance with that particular statute or regula- 
tion as a defense to an action for payment by the prospective payee.” Id. at 54. 
61. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2001–02 (2016). 
62. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (emphasis in original); see also United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United 
Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding no provisions that conditioned pay- 
ment on compliance); United States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(relators failed to allege that defendant “was expressly required to comply with [specific] standards as 
a prerequisite to payment of claims.”). The “express condition of payment” requirement is somewhat 
confusing, as it sounds similar to the separate and distinct “express certification” theory of falsity de- 
scribed above. Adding to the confusion, Mikes actually involved an express certification on a claim 
form, but one that did not address the misrepresentation in question. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697. The focus 
of the two concepts is entirely different, however: express certification focuses on the defendant’s 
statements of compliance, while the express condition of payment requirement looks to the statute and 
regulations to identify payment preconditions. 
63.  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 701 (finding that statutory provision identified by the relator was “directed at 
the provider’s continued eligibility in the Medicare program, rather than any individual incident of 
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lating administrative remedies, rather than simple denial of payment.65 
As the Tenth Circuit explained: 
Conditions of participation, as well as a provider’s certification that 
it has complied with these conditions, are enforced through admin- 
istrative mechanisms, and the ultimate sanction for violation of such 
conditions is removal from the government program . . . . Condi- 
tions of payment are those which, if the government knew they 
were not being followed, might cause it to actually refuse payment.66 
The varying penalties for violating conditions of participation reflect the 
fact that “periodic noncompliance is anticipated and built into the admin- 
istration of” many federal programs.67 For example, while nursing homes 
are expected to be in “substantial compliance” with Medicare and Medi- 
caid regulations, they often are faulted for failing to satisfy one or more 
of the detailed regulations that govern everything from food storage 
temperatures to square footage.68 Unless patients are found to be in 
“immediate jeopardy,” however, the facility generally is given a chance 
to correct the problem while remaining in (and being paid by) the pro- 
gram, subject to penalties that range from fines to corrective action plans 
to exclusion, depending on the severity and pervasiveness of the issues.69 
Some would argue that this is a distinction without a difference: if a 
violation leads to the defendant’s removal from the program, the de- 
fendant obviously will no longer be eligible for payment. The Escobar 
Court made just that point, rejecting the express condition of payment 
criterion because it would be nonsensical if “misrepresenting compliance 
with a condition of eligibility to even participate in a federal program 
when submitting a claim” could not be actionable.70 Yet this ignores the 
fact that the structure of escalating administrative penalties is designed to 
bring participants into compliance with program requirements, not to 
terminate the relationship at the first sign of trouble. Why? Because 
bringing providers into compliance furthers program aims, particularly 
for federal programs designed to assist disadvantaged populations. In 
some situations a quick termination might be harmful; nursing-home pa- 
tients, for example, are notoriously vulnerable to “transfer trauma” when 
they are forced to relocate, sometimes ending up in facilities far from 
 
 
65. See, e.g., id. at 702 (limiting implied certification to conditions of payment, and refusing to 
apply the theory to allegations that defendants’ failure to properly calibrate medical testing equipment 
rendered tests and resulting claims false). 
66. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
67. Malcolm J. Harkins, III, The Ubiquitous False Claims Act: The Incongruous Relationship 
Between a Civil War Era Fraud Statute and the Modern Administrative State, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J.  HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 131, 153, 173 (2007) (“[M]any statutes, including several provisions of the Medicare Act, 
give the agency power to waive a contractor’s liability or continue payment in certain circumstances, 
despite apparent noncompliance with regulatory standards.”). 
68.    Id. at 161. 
69. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.402 (2016); Harkins, supra note 67, at 160–61 (discussing nursing 
home process). 
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their family and friends.71 This also is true, for example, in the federal 
housing-assistance context: payments may be made despite the fact that a 
property is out of compliance, as long as the owner is working to correct 
the deficiencies.72 As one district court noted, “[t]he fact that a [payment] 
is intended to be used as a corrective tool indicates that the property for 
which [payment] is sought is not expected to be in perfect shape at the 
time a [claim] is filed.”73 
The range of penalties available for breaching a condition of partic- 
ipation, therefore, reflects an affirmative decision—by both Congress 
and the overseeing agency—as to how best to achieve program goals. Re- 
fusing payment to a property owner whose units are out of compliance 
may deny that owner the only financial resources available to bring those 
units up to code. From that vantage point, it makes sense, at least initial- 
ly, to continue to pay owners who are working to remedy the problems. 
Threatening those owners instead with FCA liability if they seek pay- 
ment would drive many participants out of the program entirely, raising 
the possibility that tenants would lose their housing—a “state of affairs 
[that] would be unacceptable to all parties and wholly inconsistent with 
federal housing policy.”74 Phrased another way, “the FCA is a blunt in- 
strument for the enforcement of statutory and regulatory compliance, 
especially where there exist administrative and other mechanisms that 
can provide more tailored or nuanced responses to the underlying 
wrongs.”75 
 
2. Pre-Escobar Materiality 
In contrast to Mikes, the First Circuit “eschewed [the] distinctions 
between factually and legally false claims, and those between implied 
and express certification . . . .”76 Instead, the court took a broad view, ask- 
ing “simply whether the defendant, in submitting a claim for reimburse- 
ment, knowingly misrepresented compliance with a material precondition 
of payment”—a condition that “need not be ‘expressly designated,’  but 
 
71. See, e.g., Terri D. Keville, Studies of Transfer Trauma in Nursing Home Patients: How the 
Legal System Has Failed to See the Whole Picture, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 421, 422 (1993). 
72. See, e.g., United States v. Intervest Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 637, 649 (S.D. Miss. 1999). 
73. Id. 
74. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit 
similarly rejected the analogous argument that an annual hospital cost report certification “condi- 
tion[s] the government’s payment on perfect compliance,” on the basis that “[r]eading the FCA oth- 
erwise would undermine the government’s own administrative scheme for ensuring that hospitals re- 
main in compliance and for bringing them back into compliance when they fall short of what the 
Medicare regulations and statutes require.” United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 
Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Harkins, supra note 67, at 165 (“Allowing FCA ac- 
tions based on regulatory violations, despite comprehensive administrative enforcement programs, 
essentially eliminates an agency’s remedial discretion and replaces Congress’s menu of remedies with 
mandatory damages and penalties.”). 
75. Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 42; see also Dacin, supra note 60, at 48 (noting importance of 
“whether there are other statutory or administrative remedies available to the government instead of, 
or prior to, withholding payment.”). 
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must be determined by ‘a close reading of the foundational documents, 
or statutes and regulations, at issue.’”77 Rather than looking to the writ- 
ten payment rules alone, this approach requires a review of all applicable 
regulations to determine whether any of them are, implicitly, conditions 
of payment. In Escobar, for example, the First Circuit interpreted state 
regulations as preconditions to MassHealth payment, despite the district 
court’s characterization of them as mere conditions of participation.78 In 
short, the materiality approach looks to the potential for the violation to 
affect the payment decision, even in the absence of any law or regulation 
clearly linking that violation to payment.79 
Materiality is not a new concept under the FCA, although it has had 
a rather convoluted history.80 Prior to 2009, the statute contained no ex- 
plicit materiality requirement, yet numerous Circuits had ruled that 
“[l]iability under each of the provisions of the False Claims Act is subject 
to the further, judicially-imposed requirement that the false statement or 
claim be material.”81 As applied, however, the concept has led to seem- 
ingly arbitrary results. For example, statements regarding Medicare cov- 
erage of off-label uses of prescription drugs, misrepresentations made to 
induce approval of a subcontract, and the failure to disclose prohibited 
industry funding in a grant application have all been found to be materi- 
al, at least for the purposes of summary judgment or motions to dismiss,82 
while allegations of improper laboratory testing procedures and misrep- 
resentations of other types of information have failed the test.83 
 
77. Id. at 512–13 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
78.    Id. at 513. 
79. As one court explained, “[t]he existence of express contractual language specifically linking 
compliance to eligibility for payment may well constitute dispositive evidence of materiality, but it is 
not . . . a necessary condition.” United States v. Science Applications Intl. Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
80. See Boese, supra note 55, at 295 (attributing roots of materiality to language in United States 
v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (holding that statute “was not designed to reach every kind of 
fraud practiced on the Government.”)). 
81. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999). Accord 
United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In addi- 
tion to the requirements found in the text, our jurisprudence holds that a false or fraudulent claim or 
statement violates the FCA only if it is material.”); United States ex rel. Berge v. Trustees of the Univ. 
of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 1997) (“If previously unclear, we now make explicit that the cur- 
rent civil False Claims Act imposes a materiality requirement.”). Other courts have applied the con- 
cept without detailed discussion, noting only that under the facts presented, the defendant’s misrepre- 
sentations could not have been material. See, e.g., United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 
1256, 1267 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting nondisclosure “could not have been material to the price negotiat- 
ed.”). 
82. See, e.g., Harrison, 176 F.3d at 791 (holding that false statements regarding subcontract were 
material to government’s decision to approve payment); United States ex rel. Cantekin v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that failure to disclose industry funding on grant 
application was material); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 53 (D.  
Mass. 2001) (holding that relator adequately alleged that false statements regarding off-label use of 
prescription drugs were material to government’s payment decision). The Senate Committee Report 
concerning the False Claims Amendments of 1986 contained a passing reference to “a material false 
statement,” without elaboration. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 20, (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5285; False Claims Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986). 
83. See, e.g., Harrison, 176 F.3d at 788–89 (holding that alleged false claims regarding scope of 
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Relying on pre-Escobar FCA materiality to define implied certifica- 
tion, however, posed several problems. For one thing, earlier cases had 
addressed materiality as a general element of FCA liability, not as a 
method of proving falsity or fraud through implied certification.84 Indeed, 
the Mikes court made clear that the implied certification analysis was 
“distinct from a requirement imposed by some courts that a false state- 
ment or claim must be material to the government’s funding decision.”85 
The situation was complicated by the passage of the Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), which added an explicit materiali- 
ty requirement to the FCA false records and reverse false claims prohibi- 
tions—but not to the basic false claims provision that forms the basis for 
implied certification.86 
A more vexing problem was the question of how, exactly, to define 
materiality. By the late 1990s, the Supreme Court had given somewhat 
inconsistent advice regarding materiality as applied to complex civil stat- 
utes such as the FCA. In the criminal context, the Court held in  Kungys 
v. United States that “a concealment or misrepresentation is material if it 
has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the 
decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”87 In the 
context of federal fraud statutes, however, the Court drew instead on the 
test used in the Restatement of Torts: 
[Whether] (a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its ex- 
istence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the representation 
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to 
regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, 
although a reasonable man would not so regard it.88 
Extrapolating the commonalities of both standards suggested that the 
core question would be whether the misrepresentation was capable of in- 
fluencing the government’s decision. 
Under Supreme Court precedent as it existed in the late 1990s, 
moreover, the applicability of materiality to the FCA itself remained un- 
clear. In United States v. Wells, the Court declined to require a showing 
of materiality under a criminal statute penalizing the making of false 
statements to federally insured banks.89 Two years later, in Neder v. Unit- 
ed States, the Court required materiality under the federal mail, wire, and 
 
Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “lie” was immaterial because compliance 
was not required); Berge, 104 F.3d at 1460–61 (holding that grant application did not actually require 
disclosure of the information allegedly misrepresented); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 
730, 733 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding there was no evidence that failure to undertake a specific type of test- 
ing was material to government’s decision). 
84. Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 31–32. 
85.   Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001). 
86. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(B), 3729(a)(1)(G), 
3729(b)(4) (2012). 
87.     485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). 
88.         Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 538 (AM. LAW. INST. 1976)). 
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bankfraud statutes but distinguished in a footnote those federal statutes 
prohibiting “both ‘false’ and ‘fraudulent’ statements or information.”90 
The FCA prohibits not only false or fraudulent claims but also the use of 
false records or statements used to get claims paid, thus straddling both of 
the Neder categories. 
At that point a curious split developed in the lower courts, based 
less on Supreme Court precedent than on differing concepts of the basis 
for materiality. As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have adopted a “natural tendency 
test” for materiality, which focuses on the potential effect of the 
false statement when it is made rather than on the false statement’s 
actual effect after it is discovered. . . . The Eighth Circuit has adopt- 
ed a more restrictive “outcome materiality test,” which requires a 
showing that the defendant’s actions (1) had the “purpose and ef- 
fect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligat- 
ed to pay,” or (2) “intentionally deprive[d] the United States of 
money it is lawfully due.”91 
The Fifth Circuit offered a slightly different explanation, situating the 
split within the “natural tendency” test itself: 
Some courts have defined the standard to require “outcome mate- 
riality”—“a falsehood or misrepresentation must affect the gov- 
ernment’s ultimate decision whether to remit funds to the claimant 
in order to be ‘material.’” . . . [while] []other court[s] require[] what 
is termed “claim materiality”—“a falsehood or misrepresentation 
must be material to the defendant’s claim of right in order to be 
considered ‘material’ for the purposes of the FCA.”92 
Under any formulation, the distinction essentially rested on whether the 
misrepresentation must have the actual ability to affect the government’s 
payment decision, or merely the potential to do so. 
This was more than a mere academic exercise. As applied, the two 
approaches differed significantly. The Fifth Circuit, for example, enunci- 
ated a broad and relatively weak test for “claim” materiality, requiring 
“only that the false or fraudulent statements either (1) make the gov- 
ernment prone to a particular impression, thereby producing some sort 
of effect, or (2) have the ability to effect the government’s actions, even if 
this is a result of indirect or intangible actions on the part of the Defend- 
ants.”93 Yet, Judge Edith Jones warned that the “outcome” test was an 
important tool to prevent the government from “eras[ing] the crucial dis- 
tinction between ‘punitive’ FCA liability and ordinary breaches of con- 
 
 
90.    Neder, 527 U.S. at 23 n.7. 
91. United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting natural tendency 
test). Cf. Wells, 519 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is a clear distinction between the con- 
cept of materiality—whether the information provided could have played a proper role in 
the…approval process—and the concept of reliance—whether the information did play a role in the 
process.”). 
92. United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 468–69 (5th Cir. 2009). 





1828 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
 
tract . . . .”94 Similarly, the Eighth  Circuit  expressed  a  strong  preference 
for “a materiality standard stricter than mere    relevancy.”95 
The disagreement, while intense, was also short-lived. In 2009, 
FERA explicitly defined FCA materiality as “having a natural tendency 
to influence, or be[ing] capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property.”96 The statute did not specifically address the out- 
come/claim debate, but courts and commentators roundly interpreted the 
legislation as adopting the lower “relevancy” threshold.97 As the Fifth 
Circuit explained, “[i]f Congress intended materiality to be defined un- 
der the more narrow-outcome materiality standard, it had ample oppor- 
tunity to adopt the outcome-materiality standard in FERA.”98 By 2010, 
the FCA thus appeared to incorporate a relatively low materiality 
threshold for false records and reverse false claims. What remained un- 
clear, however, was whether that standard also applied to implied certifi- 
cation cases arising under the basic (and un-amended) § 3729(a)(1)(A) 
false claims prohibition. As it turned out, Escobar would provide surpris- 
ing answers in both respects. 
 
D. Escobar 
At first glance, the fact-intensive Escobar case—requiring the courts 
to parse language not only in the federal Medicaid statute, but also in the 
MassHealth and general health care licensure regulations—made the 
case an unlikely candidate for certiorari. Of the 2015 implied certification 
cases, however, Escobar offered an unusually emotionally compelling set 
of facts: alleged medical supervision failures that led to the death of a 
young woman.99 Perhaps for that reason, Escobar became the vehicle 
through which implied certification finally reached the Supreme Court.100 
Petitioner Universal Health Services (“UHS”) asked the Court to 
resolve the circuit split by declining to recognize the implied certification 
theory at all, relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 for the 
 
94. United States v. Southland Mgt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 680 (5th Cir. 2003) (Jones, J., concur- 
ring). 
95. United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2003). It was possi- 
ble, however, for defendants to prevail even under the stricter natural tendency test. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing jury 
verdict in favor of relator). 
96.   31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012). 
97. See, e.g., Longhi, 575 F.3d at 470. 
98. Id.; see also Boese, supra note 55, at 299–302 (describing DOJ strategy and passage of 
FERA). 
99. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016). 
100. One could make a strong argument that the most important of the 2015 cases should have 
been United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., in which a military contractor was alleged to 
have falsified marksmanship scores for Ugandan security guards. 775 F.3d 628, 636 (4th Cir. 2015). 
While the prospect of the government contracting with security guards at an airbase in Iraq who were 
unable to shoot certainly should give one pause, the Fourth Circuit’s rather dry analysis of “Theater- 
Wide Internal Security Services Task Orders” clearly lacked Escobar’s emotional impact. For a discus- 
sion of Triple Canopy, see Joan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit Got 
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proposition that a failure to disclose noncompliance is not fraudulent in 
the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose; as a fallback, UHS asked 
the Court to restrict implied certification to violations of expressly desig- 
nated conditions of payment, as in Mikes.101 The respondents, supported 
by the United States as amicus curiae, responded that a defendant who 
knowingly bills the government for services without disclosing a failure 
to satisfy material conditions for the delivery of those services has sub- 
mitted a false claim, and they argued that Restatement § 529 applies to a 
party that knows its failure to disclose additional information renders its 
statements materially misleading.102 In essence, UHS sought to restrict 
the theory to situations where a claimant speaks falsely, while the rela- 
tors and the government sought to apply it when the claimant remains 
silent as well. While few observers expected the Court to abolish implied 
certification entirely, at oral argument the Justices appeared deeply di- 
vided as to the scope of the theory and any limiting principles that could 
distinguish relevant from irrelevant misrepresentations.103 
Not surprisingly, the Court declined the invitation to preclude im- 
plied certification suits, holding that omissions may give rise to liability 
“when the defendant submits a claim for payment that makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided, but knowingly fails 
to disclose . . . noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement.”104 The Justices also had little trouble rejecting the request 
to limit the theory to violations of expressly designated conditions of 
payment, noting that such a limit would be both over- and under- 
inclusive.105 Such a rule could allow defendants to escape liability for vio- 
lations that, while not risking payment, might have prevented them from 
participating in Medicaid in the first place; conversely, the government 
might explicitly condition payment on compliance with every regulatory 
provision, creating the very unlimited liability UHS feared.106 
Mere noncompliance, however, was not enough. The Justices defini- 
tively held that a misrepresentation also must be material to the govern- 
ment’s payment decision.107 Given the history of FCA materiality, UHS 
might have been forgiven for assuming at that point that the case was 
lost. Yet here the opinion shifted significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, 
in the petitioners’ favor. Rather than adopting the government’s view 
that any violation is material as “long as the defendant knows that the 
Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the 
violation,” the Justices instead characterized the materiality standard as 
 
101. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001–02. 
102.   Id. at 1999–2000. 
103. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, 19–20, 35–37, 49, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Unit- 
ed States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7). 
104. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995. 
105.    Id. at 1996. 
106. Id. at 2002. Note that the Justices appear to have conflated the “condition of participation” 
analysis with the traditional “fraud-by-the-inducement” theory of FCA liability. See supra Subsection 
II.C.1. 
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“demanding.”108 Although they did not provide a clear definition,109 the 
Justices proceeded to reject essentially all of the standards adopted by 
the lower courts over the years. Instead, the Justices turned back to the 
common law, identifying a common focus on the effect of the misrepre- 
sentation on the government—either because a reasonable person would 
find the misrepresentation important or because the defendant knew the 
government actually considered it important to the payment decision.110 
As the Court explained: 
A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because 
the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of payment. 
Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the Government 
would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defend- 
ant’s compliance. Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where 
the noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.111 
While perhaps a refreshing breath of common sense in the midst of a typ- 
ically legalistic Supreme Court term, the Escobar opinion left many ques- 
tions unanswered, and added more than a few of its own. 
 
III. THE COURT REMAINS SILENT 
Ironically—or perhaps fittingly—for a case that rests on the distinc- 
tion between speaking and remaining silent, the Escobar opinion left 
open a number of important issues, including the threshold question of 
whether we now have a coherent test defining implied certification. Cru- 
cially, the opinion failed to answer a number of questions regarding the 
concept of materiality, including: 1) when a misrepresentation is consid- 
ered to be material; 2) which elements of the FCA are subject to materi- 
ality analysis; 3) the vantage point from which materiality should be as- 
sessed; 4) the timing of the materiality assessment; and 5) the practical 
effects of these standards, particularly given the pressure to settle. Esco- 
bar not only missed an opportunity to resolve some of these debates, but 
also introduced confounding new questions that are likely to generate 
more, rather than less, litigation over the implied certification theory.112 
 
108.    Id. at 2004. 
109.    Id. at 2002–03. 
110.   Id. 
111.    Id. at 2003. 
112. As of August 2017, it appears that eight Circuits have issued opinions applying Escobar to 
implied certification, including the First Circuit’s decision on remand. See, e.g., United States ex rel.  
Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2017) (concluding that government properly stated     
a claim under the FCA); Abbott v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirm-  
ing grant of summary judgment for defendants); United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sci., Inc., No. 15-
16380, 2017 WL 2884047 (9th Cir., July 7, 2017) (holding that the relators’ complaints were suffi- cient 
to survive dismissal); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 2017) (af- firming 
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant); United States ex rel. McBride v. Hallibur-   ton Co., 
848 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant); 
D’Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to amend 
complaint); United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2016) 
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A. A Coherent Test for Implied Certification? 
The Escobar Court set forth what appeared to be a standard, two- 
pronged test for implied certification under § 3729(a)(1)(A): 
[T]he implied certification theory can be a basis for liability, at least 
where two conditions are satisfied: first, the claim does not merely 
request payment, but also makes specific representations about the 
goods or services provided; and second, defendant’s failure to dis- 
close noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contrac- 
tual requirements makes those representations half-truths.113 
But what, exactly, is a “specific representation” about goods or services? 
Clearly it is not limited to an explicit representation, which should be ac- 
tionable under the separate false-records provision in § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
Yet the parties advanced drastically different visions of the types of im- 
plicit representations, if any, encompassed within a claim for government 
payment. The relators (supported by the government) argued that all 
submitted claims include an implicit representation that the claimant is 
legally entitled to payment, and the failure to disclose violations threaten- 
ing that entitlement makes a claim misleading; UHS, in contrast, argued 
that claimants need not disclose noncompliance absent an affirmative du- 
ty to do so.114 The Justices explicitly declined to resolve the question of 
whether submission of a claim signals legal entitlement, relying instead 
on the common-law rule that “half-truths—representations that state the 
truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying infor- 
mation—can be actionable misrepresentations.”115 Here, those half-truths 
 
481 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of complaint); United States v. Sanford-Brown, 840 F.3d 445 
(7th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s dismissal of implied certification allegations); United States 
ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2016) (reversing district court’s dismissal of 
fraudulent inducement allegations for lack of materiality); United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Men- 
tal Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F. 3d 770 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming in part and reversing in part district 
court’s dismissal of FCA claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Cf. United States ex rel. Nargol, No. 16- 
1442 (1st Cir., July 26, 2017) (affirming in part and reversing in part dismissal of relators’ claims under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)); United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 838 
F.3d 750, 761–62 n.2 (6th Cir. 2016) (declining to address potential effect of Escobar because parties 
did not raise the issue on appeal). 
113. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. Interestingly, there appears to be disagreement at the district 
court level as to whether the words “at least” were meant to signify that the test is non-exclusive, ra- 
ther than mandatory. Compare, e.g., Rose v. Stephens Inst., No. 09-CV-05966-PJH, 2016 WL 5076214, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (concluding that Escobar did “not purport to set out, as an absolute 
requirement, that implied false certification liability can attach only when these two conditions are 
met”) (emphasis in original), with United States ex rel. Ctr. For Employment Training, 2:13-cv-01697- 
KJM-KJN, 2016 WL 4210052, at *5 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2016) (stating that “to establish implied false 
certification, a plaintiff must” meet the two-part test) (emphasis added). In a July 2017 opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit appeared to treat the test as mandatory, although without referencing to the debate. 
Campie, 2017 WL 2884047, at *6 (“The Supreme Court held that although the implied certification 
theory can be a basis for liability, two conditions must be satisfied.”) (emphasis added). 
114.     Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999–2000. 
115. Id. at 2000. The Justices’ silence regarding the broader legal entitlement argument may have 
created another nascent Circuit split. Noting that the Supreme Court had left the issue open, the 
Fourth Circuit answered that question in the affirmative. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, 
Inc., 857 F.3d 174, slip op. at 8 n.3 (4th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, appears to have re- 
fused to construe general claims as containing specific representations of compliance. See Kelly, 846 
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included UHS’s representations that specific types of therapy had been 
performed by specific categories of mental health professionals, as well   
as the staffers’ use of identification numbers reserved for licensed indi- 
viduals with particular qualifications.116 
The problem is that the Justices offered no guidance for determin- 
ing when such specific representations have been made, or how specific 
they need be. By differentiating claims incorporating specific representa- 
tions from claims that “merely request payment,” the Court suggested 
that there are, in fact, some claims that make no such representations. 
Yet it is difficult to imagine a claim for payment that does not implicitly 
suggest, at the very least, that the claimant has done whatever it needs to 
do to be paid. Viewed in that light, the universe of claims that do not 
make specific representations may well be a null set.117 
The Court did suggest that not all representations are actionable— 
just those rendered misleading by the failure to disclose noncompliance. 
In Escobar, for example, it was misleading for UHS to file claims imply- 
ing that therapy had been provided by appropriately licensed individuals. 
We are left to surmise that silence regarding some unspecified, less- 
relevant factor would not suffice. In turn, this suggests that it is not the 
specificity of the representation, but rather its importance—or in lay 
terms, its “materiality”—that determines whether the omission is mis- 
leading. But materiality comprises the second prong of the Court’s im- 
plied certification test, not the first. If the only way to determine whether 
a representation is specific enough to satisfy the first prong is to assess 
whether it is material under the second prong, then the test, ipso facto, 
collapses into itself. 
 
B. Material Questions 
Defining implied certification by reference to materiality is not a 
groundbreaking concept. Yet the Court’s acontextual analysis of materi- 
ality served to unmoor the concept from both the FCA text and prior 
case law, while simultaneously claiming to follow precedent. More im- 
portantly, the centrality of materiality as the defining factor in implied 
certification cases will require future courts to grapple with crucial issues 




resentations about performance). See also United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 
1027, 1031 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (recognizing but declining to address the issue). 
116. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2000–01. Oddly, the other sources cited by the Court for this proposi- 
tion included a 1938 New York case involving the failure of a seller to mention that not two but three 
new roads might affect a parcel of property offered for sale, as well as a Vermont case involving an 
adjunct professor’s failure to explain that his “retirement” was in fact a prison term. Id. at 2000 (cita- 
tions omitted). 
117. Of course, failure of proof remains a defense. See Sanford-Brown, 840 F.3d at 447 (relator 
“offered no evidence that defendant . . . made any representations at all in connection with its claims 
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1. When is a Misrepresentation Material? 
The single biggest weakness in the Escobar opinion is the failure to 
clearly define materiality. As noted above, FERA explicitly required a 
showing of materiality under the false records and reverse false claims 
prohibitions,118 defining the term as “having a natural tendency to influ- 
ence, or be[ing] capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money 
or property.”119 Instead of taking the straightforward path by confirming 
that the FERA definition also applies to the false claims prohibition    in 
§ 3729(a)(1)(A), the Justices merely noted that the FERA test is similar 
to those derived from the common law. At oral argument, the Justices 
had explored at length whether the FCA should be interpreted through 
the lens of common law tort definitions of fraud, or instead the tradition- 
al contract law distinction between material and nonmaterial contract 
terms.120 Once again declining the opportunity to lay down a bright-line 
rule, the opinion simply noted that the tort and contract definitions were 
“substantially similar” and equivalent to the FERA language: “[u]nder 
any understanding of the concept, materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the 
likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresenta- 
tion.’”121 
While perhaps a sensible middle ground, the problem is that these 
various conceptions of materiality, at least as applied under the FCA, 
historically have not been treated as equivalent. The Justices went on to 
characterize the materiality standard as “demanding,” noting the allega- 
tion that UHS’s noncompliance was “so central to the provision of men- 
tal health counseling that the Medicaid program would not have paid 
these claims had it known of these violations.”122 Judging materiality by 
virtue of the “centrality” of the noncompliance to the payment decision, 
however, evokes the separate and distinct condition-of-payment stand- 
ard: whether compliance “lies at the core of [defendant’s] agreement 
with the Government [such that] the Government would have refused to 
pay had it been aware . . . .”123 In effect, the Justices rejected the pay- 





118. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012) (prohibiting “a false record or statement material to a false 
or fraudulent claim”); id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (prohibiting “a false record or statement material to an obli- 
gation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government”) (emphasis added). 
119.    Id. § 3729(b)(4). 
120. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, 19–20, 35–37, 49, Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 
15-7). 
121. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citations omitted). On remand, the First Circuit cited a (non- 
implied certification) post-Escobar case in which the panel had concluded that “the fundamental in- 
quiry is ‘whether a piece of information is sufficiently important to influence the behavior of the recip- 
ient.’” United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(citing United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir. 2016)). 
122. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004. 
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fication,124 only to seemingly resurrect that standard as the core of the 
materiality test. 
Rather than a bright-line rule, the Justices offered a set of illustra- 
tions: 
[T]he Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision as a 
condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. 
Likewise, proof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily 
limited to, evidence that the defendant knows that the Government 
consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on 
noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or contrac- 
tual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a particular 
claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements 
were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements 
are not material. Or, if the Government regularly pays a particular 
type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain require- 
ments were violated, and has signaled no change in position, that is 
strong evidence that the requirements are not material.125 
As described, however, this “demanding” form of materiality is almost 
entirely unlike FCA materiality as it has been applied to date. Far from 
universally being interpreted as a high bar, FERA’s “natural tendency to 
influence” language has long been viewed as signifying a relatively low 
threshold for implied certification compared to the alternatives.126 In- 
deed, the government itself had argued, consistent with the First Circuit’s 
decision, that any violation should be considered material as “long as the 
defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse pay- 
ment were it aware of the violation”—a proposition the Justices flatly re- 
jected.127 The Court’s approach harkens back to the short-lived, pre- 
FERA debate over “claim” and “outcome” materiality, a debate re- 
solved by the widespread assumption that FERA had adopted the lower 
threshold.128 Without any acknowledgement of the implications (or even 
the history), the Court seemingly adopted the more stringent outcome 
approach. 
 
2. Which FCA Elements Are Subject to Escobar Materiality  Analysis? 
A related concern is the question of which elements of the FCA will 
be governed by this new standard of materiality. There is a significant 
difference between invoking materiality as a theory of falsity and impos- 
ing it as an additional element of the basic FCA cause of action. That dis- 
tinction has been clear since the days of United States ex rel. Mikes v. 
Straus, in which the Second Circuit clarified that implied certification and 
 
124. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (cautioning that “[a] misrepresentation cannot be deemed mate- 
rial merely because the Government designates compliance . . . as a condition of payment”)). 
125.    Id. at 2003–04. 
126. See, e.g., Boese, supra note 55, at 298–301 (describing history). 
127. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004. 
128. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 
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materiality were separate concepts: “A materiality requirement holds 
that only a subset of admittedly false claims is subject to False Claims 
Act liability . . . . We rule simply that not all instances of regulatory non- 
compliance will cause a claim to become false.”129 Moreover, defining 
implied certification by reference to materiality is curious in light of the 
fact that FERA established materiality as a separate and distinct element 
of the FCA false records and reverse false claims prohibitions. In con- 
trast, implied certification cases such as Escobar arise under the basic 
false claims provision in § 3729(a)(1)(A), which Congress did not amend. 
Without addressing the fundamental distinction identified by Mikes, the 
Court tacitly appeared to ratify the conclusions of the lower courts that 
have read materiality into § 3729(a)(1)(A) as well.130 
Yet the Court utterly failed to consider the effect of grafting a po- 
tentially distinct “Escobar materiality” standard on to the FERA defini- 
tion in the statute. By stating that the common law and FERA materiali- 
ty standards were equivalent—and then applying an interpretation not 
seen outside the few circuits adopting the pre-FERA “outcome” materi- 
ality approach—the Court created an intriguing dilemma. If Escobar is 
limited to § 3729(a)(1)(A) false claims, then the statute will encompass 
two different materiality standards: one for false claims and another for 
false records and reverse false claims. In contrast, if Escobar is merely 
the Court’s interpretation of the existing statutory definition—perhaps 
unlikely, given the Justices’ refusal to decide whether the § 3729(b)(4) 
definition applies to § 3729(a)(1)(A) as well—then the Court effectively 
(and once again tacitly) may have redefined materiality for false records 
and reverse false claims as well. Preliminary indications suggest that the 
appellate courts may apply the new test broadly.131 
If that wasn’t enough, the opinion also failed to clarify whether ma- 
teriality is required only in suits brought under the implied certification 
theory or whether it applies to all suits under § 3729(a)(1)(A), including 
garden-variety, factually false allegations. At first blush this may not 
seem problematic: demanding payment for a product that was not pro- 
vided, or for treating a patient who was never seen by the physician, 
seems a quintessentially material misrepresentation. But factually false 
claims also encompass other situations where the falsity or fraud may be 
far more tangential. Imagine, for example, a provider whose reckless 
 
129.   Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001). 
130. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(identifying materiality as one of the four elements of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)); Longhi, 575 F.3d at 
467 (reading general materiality requirement into statute); Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lin- 
coln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 
101 CAL. L. REV. 227, 234 (2013). 
131. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sci., Inc., No. 15-16380 (9th Cir. July 7, 2017), 
2017 WL 2884047 at *9 (applying FERA definition while citing to Escobar); United States ex rel. Es- 
cobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (reaffirming initial decision to re- 
verse the district court’s dismissal of the suit); United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 
F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Escobar’s definition of materiality to a fraudulent inducement case 
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oversight of the billing process routinely leads to the submission of bills  
for services actually rendered, but with slightly incorrect dates of service.  
It might be difficult for such allegations to satisfy a stringent materiality 
standard, despite the claims being factually—and “knowingly”— 
inaccurate. The Justices offered no guidance as to whether Escobar was 
intended to reach these types of suits as  well. 
 
3. Whose View of Materiality Prevails? 
In addition to raising problems in the definition and application of 
materiality, the Escobar decision offers little clarity regarding the van- 
tage point from which materiality must be assessed. The opinion itself is 
internally inconsistent regarding whether materiality is dependent on 
what the government does or on what the defendant knows. At the be- 
ginning of the opinion, the Court stated that “[w]hat matters is not the 
label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defend- 
ant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material 
to the Government’s payment decision.”132 Under that formulation, the 
analysis appears to turn not only on what the government considers ma- 
terial, but also on whether the defendant is aware of that interpretation, 
or at least acts with reckless disregard or deliberate indifference as to the 
possibility.133 Yet by the time the Court turned to a fuller discussion of 
materiality, consideration of the defendant’s knowledge had all but 
dropped out, replaced instead by a detailed analysis of how to determine 
whether the misrepresentation was, in fact, material to the government 
as the recipient of the information.134 
At one level, this may not be surprising: the fact that a representa- 
tion is material to the government’s payment decision is, logically, a pre- 
condition to the defendant being aware of that fact. And yet, it is curious 
that nowhere in the detailed analysis of materiality (nor in the final para- 
graphs summarizing the holding) does the Court return to the seemingly 
central question of whether it is materiality to the government alone, or 
the defendant’s knowledge thereof, that matters. As a result, the opinion 
may be read to require proof of scienter regarding materiality as well as 
falsity or fraud, a holding that may favor defendants in FCA litigation. 
The Court’s emphasis on the effect of the misrepresentation on “the 
government’s” payment decision also obscures a crucial fact in FCA cas- 
es, especially those arising in the health care context: there is usually 
more than one government entity involved. The Escobar materiality ap- 
proach treats the government as a monolithic claims determination entity 
when, in fact, at least two separate agencies are involved: (a) the agency 
that makes the payment determination, usually CMS and/or a state Med- 
icaid agency; and (b) the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which   repre- 
 
132. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (emphasis added). 
133.    Id. at 2001–02. 
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sents the United States in FCA litigation.135 As Michael Herz and Neal 
Devins warned in the analogous context of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, while “academics and government lawyers alike take for grant- 
ed that DOJ ought to speak the government’s voice in court,” that ap- 
proach may be inconsistent with the regulatory agency’s substantive con- 
trol of the program.136 The argument for DOJ control may be strong in 
criminal prosecution, but “is far more attenuated in the case of civil judi- 
cial enforcement actions, and may cut the other way in a challenge to 
agency regulations brought in the court of appeals on the administrative 
record, on a legally and factually complex and technical point.”137 Medi- 
care and Medicaid FCA allegations often fall into this latter category. 
While the views of federal health care program regulators and pros- 
ecutors often may be in sync,138 there have been notable exceptions. For 
example, in Northern Health Facilities, Inc. v. United States,139 a nursing 
and rehabilitation center resolved FCA allegations with the DOJ by en- 
tering into a Consent Order that permitted the facility to continue partic- 
ipating in Medicare. Soon afterwards, the Health Care Financing Admin- 
istration (“HCFA”), the predecessor to CMS, decided to terminate the 
facility’s Medicare participation.140 When the facility sued to enjoin the 
termination, arguing that HCFA was thwarting the remedial measures 
adopted by the Consent Order, the district court denied the motion be- 
cause the agency had not been a party to the original FCA suit.141 But the 
judge went on to express concern about the “inequitable result”: 
[T]he Court wishes to express its concerns about the fairness of this 
action . . . . Plaintiff has argued that “Greenbelt and its residents are 
caught in a conflict between competing Governmental objectives 
which they cannot control.” . . . The Court agrees with this proposi- 
tion . . . . It is clear that two different arms of the Federal Govern- 
ment, with two different views on how Greenbelt’s programs should 
be addressed, were involved in these cases.142 
The different views stem from the fact that the individuals charged with 
administering federal programs and those charged with investigating and 
prosecuting fraud may have different training, different goals, and differ- 
ent core mindsets. 
 
135. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ 
Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2000). 
136. Id. at 1346. Herz and Devins posit three ways in which this may be reflected: a reduction in    
the scope and effectiveness of the agency’s own enforcement efforts, avoidable losses in court, and the 
potential for DOJ to interfere with agency decision-making.   Id. 
137. Id. at 1363. Herz and Devins advocate for DOJ to take more “seriously its role as lawyer for” 
the agency as its client. Id. at 1375. 
138. Not surprisingly, where DOJ and agency views are in sync—particularly in opposition to the 
relator’s claims—courts are inclined to agree. See, e.g., Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 
730, 732–33 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that relator had failed to provide any evidence that the failure to 
perform her preferred plasma testing “was material to the United States’ buying decision; the [DOJ] 
has conspicuously declined to adopt Luckey’s position or to prosecute this claim on its own behalf.”). 
139.   39 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 1998). 
140.    Id. at 566. 
141.    Id. at 576. 
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As Professor David Hyman has argued (albeit with some hyperbo- 
le), while the primary motivation of program administrators is to assure 
that the program runs efficiently and meets its goals, fraud control per- 
sonnel are by contrast “[s]uspicious by nature and training . . . [and] view 
every provider as a potential exploiter of the public fisc and every claim 
as the tip of a proverbial fraudulent iceberg.”143 Logically, program integ- 
rity should complement program administration: preventing limited pro- 
gram funds from being lost to fraud is necessary to achieve the program’s 
goals. But clashes may occur when regulators and prosecutors have dif- 
ferent interpretations of the same facts, in the service of different policy 
goals.144 
Particularly relevant to the implied certification debate, administra- 
tors may sometimes find that the program’s goals are better served by 
quietly ignoring certain types of violations. “Indeed, noncompliance with 
contractual requirements can become the norm, as both providers and 
program administrators recognize that legislative standards are simply 
aspirational or cannot be accomplished for the amounts the government 
is willing to pay.”145 Thus, it is not difficult to imagine a situation—not 
unlike Escobar itself—where CMS and/or a state Medicaid agency has 
paid a set of claims despite a tacit misrepresentation, yet the DOJ argues 
that the misrepresentation should have been material to the payment de- 
termination and therefore violates the FCA. 
A certain level of comfort might be derived from the fact that, as a 
practical matter, it will be difficult for the DOJ to pursue a case post- 
Escobar when the paying agency disagrees that the noncompliance was 
material and refuses to cooperate. But the same cannot be said in cases 
brought by qui tam relators, who may sue based on interpretations of 
statutes or regulations that differ not only from that of the paying agency 
but also from DOJ priorities.146 Indeed, the parents in Escobar argued 
that the mental health clinic violated regulations that were critical to the 
MassHealth payment decision, yet Massachusetts regulators imposed 
minimal, nonpayment-related penalties—leading UHS to argue that  the 
 
 
143. David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the    
Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 544–46 (2001). 
144. Of course, this does not mean that program administrators are always correct in their inter- 
pretations. As the Tenth Circuit recently noted in a blistering opinion: “This case has taken us to a 
strange world where [CMS] itself . . . seems unable to keep pace with its own frenetic lawmaking. . . . 
[A]n agency decision that loses track of its own controlling regulations and applies the wrong rules in 
order to penalize private citizens can never stand.” Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 
824 F.3d 968, 976–77 (10th Cir. 2016). 
145. Hyman, supra note 143, at 545; see also id. at 563 (“It is bad if the program goals dog bites off 
its fraud control tail, but it is worse if the fraud control tail starts wagging the program goals dog.”). 
Prosecutors, of course, have another name for this phenomenon: collusion between the agency and the 
defendant. 
146. Indeed, Herz and Devins describe the FCA qui tam provisions as an example of when “the 
litigator’s role is taken out of the hands of government attorneys altogether.” Herz & Devins, supra 
note 135, at 1346–47; see also Boese, supra note 55, at 297 (describing differing motivations). For dis- 
cussion of broader concerns regarding agency control of litigation, see generally, David Freeman Eng- 
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relators were “usurp[ing] the government’s primary role in evaluating 
and adjudicating violations of its regulations.”147 
The Escobar Court’s concept of materiality, emphasizing the likely 
rather than the potential effect of the misrepresentation on the payment 
decision, provides some protection against far-fetched implied certifica- 
tion allegations. Yet before a court can apply the Escobar standard, de- 
fendants will be required to incur the substantial costs of defending the 
suit through the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage—if they 
can wait that long before settling.148 Moreover, courts will be called to 
make this determination long after the fact, with no guarantee that the 
judges will interpret the effect of a particular provision on payment con- 
sistent with the paying agency.149 Of course, an implied misrepresentation 
alone does not prove a violation of the FCA; the government or relator 
must still establish the remaining FCA elements, most notably scienter. 
The fact that two branches of the government come to differing interpre- 
tations as to the materiality of a violation, however, may well bolster the 
argument that the defendant was at least reckless in disregarding that 
possibility. 
 
4. When is Materiality Assessed? 
The Escobar opinion also raises an interesting question regarding 
the temporal relationship between the misrepresentation and the pay- 
ment decision: must the government know of the misrepresentation be- 
fore the payment decision is made and pay the claim anyway, or can the 
government subsequently determine that the misrepresentation would 
not have been material? In its list of examples illustrating materiality, the 
Court seemingly adopted a prospective approach: 
[I]f the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very 
strong evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if the 
Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite 
actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has 
signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the re- 
quirements are not material.150 
 
147. Brief for the Petitioner at 51, Universal  Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex  rel. Escobar,  
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7). 
148. See infra Section III.C. 
149. To put it another way, “[i]t is cheaper and more effective for the agency to decide the scope     
of FCA certification ex ante than it is for courts to do so ex post.” Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 52;    
see also Harkins, supra note 67 at 134 (criticizing decision in United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of 
Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the Ninth Circuit “adopted a sweeping interpretation of 
‘false or fraudulent’ that effectively nullified the Department of Education’s (DOE) discretionary de- 
cision to  treat  alleged  statutory  and regulatory  infractions as  administrative  enforcement matters,  not 
as fraud upon the government.”). The potential for differing interpretations is clear just from the Es-  
cobar litigation itself. On remand, the First Circuit bluntly stated “that the government conditioned 
MassHealth’s payments on compliance with the licensing and professionalism regulations,” despite the 
district court’s contrary factual findings. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 
842 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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This suggests that payment will provide the strongest evidence of nonma- 
teriality when the government is aware of the underlying problem and 
chooses to pay anyway, such as when the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) continues to make housing assistance 
payments for an unsatisfactory property in the hope that the funds will 
enable the owner to bring the units into compliance.151 It also suggests lit- 
tle sympathy, although not an absolute bar, for situations in which the 
government did not become aware of the problems until after the claims 
were paid. Yet the Court’s acknowledgement that nonmateriality can be 
based on payment decisions over time suggests a tacit recognition that 
materiality contains retrospective elements as well: in the absence of a 
change in official position, claimants are entitled to rely on the fact that 
noncompliant claims “regularly” have been paid in the past. 
The Escobar facts suggest a further permutation of the problem: 
what happens when the government, now fully aware of the problem, 
continues to pay claims? After Yarushka Rivera’s death, her parents re- 
quested investigations by multiple Massachusetts state agencies.152 The 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health concluded that the facility 
had violated fourteen regulations related to staff supervision and licen- 
sure, and required the facility to enter into a plan of correction; the 
Board of Registration of Social Workers imposed supervised probation 
on the clinical director and required a staffer who improperly held her- 
self out as a psychologist to enter into a consent agreement and pay a 
$1,000 civil penalty.153 Yet there is no indication that MassHealth ever 
sought repayment of the funds, nor threatened to suspend or revoke the 
facility’s right to submit future claims. Although the state did not have 
knowledge of the violations prior to paying the claims, it clearly had that 
knowledge after the investigation. While this obviously cannot establish 
the bona fides of an improper claim, an after-the-fact determination that 
future claims are not barred may nonetheless be relevant to materiali- 
ty.154 
On remand, however, the First Circuit resisted this broad reading, 
construing materiality in a narrowly defined timeframe. First, the court 
noted that there was no evidence in the record suggesting that 
MassHealth had continued to pay UHS after discovering the fraud: the 
allegations only concerned alleged fraud in reimbursements paid before 
the filing of the complaint, which occurred close to a year before the 
 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 683–84 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“HUD’s policy of approving continued subsidy payments notwithstanding the property’s declining 
condition was based not on its ignorance of the true condition but upon the imperative to provide 
housing for the tenants while HUD supervised the use of the limited funds it allocated to the pro- 
ject.”). 
152. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 510 (1st Cir.   
2015). 
153. Id. 
154. See BOESE, supra note 36, § 2.03[F][1][b] (describing post hoc government “ratification” of 
claims); see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
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Massachusetts agencies completed their investigations.155 Second, be- 
cause the allegations focused only on the treatment of Yarushka Rivera, 
which by definition ended at the time of her death, no later reimburse- 
ment practices were relevant.156 While acknowledging evidence that 
MassHealth had continued to pay UHS despite being aware of the non- 
compliance might well “come to light during discovery,” the court held 
that it was not necessary at this early stage of the litigation.157 Whether 
most circuits adopt this narrow timeframe remains to be seen. 
Restricting the analysis to the government’s a priori awareness also 
conflates materiality with the distinct concept of a “government 
knowledge” defense, which posits that in some circumstances the gov- 
ernment’s prior awareness of noncompliance may preclude FCA liabil- 
ity.158 To the extent it is recognized, courts have approached government 
knowledge from two vastly different vantage points. Early FCA cases 
appeared to hold that government knowledge negated the falsity itself, 
emphasizing that by paying a known noncomplaint claim, “[t]he govern- 
ment knew what it wanted, and it got what it paid for.”159 It strains credu- 
lity, however, to argue that the government’s awareness can transform a 
false representation into a truthful one: MassHealth’s knowledge of the 
UHS licensure issues, for example, could not miraculously convert the 
unlicensed therapist into a licensed psychologist. The far more logical 
approach is to consider government knowledge relevant not to the issue 
of falsity itself, but rather to the defendant’s scienter: a defendant who 
truly believes the government is willing to pay despite the noncompliance 
has not acted with knowledge that the government considers the claim to 
be false or fraudulent.160 
Escobar raises a third, largely unrecognized alternative: considering 
government knowledge relevant not just to falsity or scienter, but also to 
materiality. The Court never addressed the concept of government 
knowledge directly. But by suggesting that the government’s affirmative 
decision to pay noncompliant claims may render the noncompliance im- 
 
155. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in a case alleging fraud on the Food & Drug 
Administration. United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sci., Inc., No. 15-16380, 2017 WL 2884047 (9th 
Cir., July 7, 2017). While acknowledging that “[r]elators thus face an uphill battle in alleging materiali- 
ty sufficient to maintain their claims,” the court nevertheless characterized the issues as “matters of 
proof, not legal grounds to dismiss relators’ complaints.” Id. at *9, 11. The court concluded, 
“[a]lthough it may be that the government regularly pays this particular type of claim in full despite 
actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, such evidence is not before us.” Id. at *11. 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 682–83 (5th Cir. 2003) (in- 
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
159. United States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1999). 
160. See, e.g., Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 534 (10th Cir. 2000) (“There  
may still be occasions when the government’s knowledge of or cooperation with a contractor’s actions    
is so extensive that the contractor could not as a matter of law possess the requisite state of mind to be 
liable under the FCA.”); Michael J. Davidson, The Government Knowledge Defense to the Civil False 
Claims Act: A Misnomer by Any Other Name Does Not Sound as  Sweet, 45  IDAHO L. REV. 41, 42  
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material, especially when done repeatedly, the opinion invoked a very 
similar concept. 
 
C. Materiality in the Context of FCA Procedure and Penalties 
For all the discussion of applying common-law concepts of fraud 
within the context of twenty-first-century government contracting, the 
Justices all but avoided perhaps the most crucial FCA issue: the relent- 
less drive toward settlement. Due to the magnitude of the potential statu- 
tory penalties and damages,161 as a practical matter the vast majority of 
health care FCA cases will settle rather than proceeding to trial, particu- 
larly after the denial of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
Escobar is unlikely to stem that tide. In what someday may come to be 
known as “the infamous Escobar footnote 6,” the Court rejected the ar- 
gument that materiality would prove an unworkable standard in early- 
stage FCA litigation: 
We reject Universal Health’s assertion that materiality is too fact 
intensive for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion 
to dismiss or at summary judgment. The standard for materiality 
that we have outlined is a familiar and rigorous one. And False 
Claims Act plaintiffs also must plead their claims with plausibility 
and particularly under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b), 
for instance.162 
What the Justices failed to acknowledge, perhaps due to their misconcep- 
tion that they were applying a standard identical to traditional FCA ma- 
teriality, is that satisfying this “demanding” materiality test may well re- 
quire further development of the record compared to prior FCA cases. 
In a jurisdiction adopting either a narrow, natural-tendency materi- 
ality test or the precondition-to-payment test, the issues to be addressed 
at the dismissal or summary judgment stage were straightforward and 
largely textual: under the relevant statute, regulations, or contract, could 
the misrepresentation have affected the payment decision? That was the 
posture of Escobar in the district court, which dismissed the relators’ 
complaint.163 Proving that the defendant’s misrepresentation actually af- 
fected the outcome, as the Court appears to require, will demand a far 
more fact-intensive inquiry into the government’s payment procedures–– 
not just for this defendant, but also potentially for similarly situated pro- 
viders as well. That inquiry may require the review of evidence that nei- 
 
161.   31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2012). 
162. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 n.6   
(2016). For an example of a 9(b) case arising in this context, see United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia 
Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of majority of 
FCA claims for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) because allegations were based solely on relator’s opinion,   
but reversing dismissal of allegations based on express false statements regarding billing codes). Re- 
gardless, it is doubtful the footnote will rival that of the famed Carolene Products Footnote 4. United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
163. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 11-11170-DPW,  
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ther the defendant nor the relator have in their possession early in the 
litigation.164 
Observers did not have to wait long for the first indication that post- 
Escobar implied certification allegations would likely proceed to the dis- 
covery stage. Less than six months after the Supreme Court decision, the 
disposition of Escobar on remand offered a clear example. The First Cir- 
cuit rejected the defendant’s arguments that the government had contin- 
ued to pay UHS after becoming aware of the noncompliance, noting not 
only the lack of evidence in the record but also the extreme difficulty of 
obtaining such evidence at this stage of the litigation: 
We see no reason to require Relators at the Motion to Dismiss 
phase to learn, and then to allege, the government’s payment prac- 
tices for claims unrelated to services rendered to the deceased fami- 
ly member in order to establish the government’s views on the ma- 
teriality of the violation. Indeed, given applicable federal and state 
privacy regulations in the healthcare industry, it is highly question- 
able whether Relators could have even accessed such information.165 
While such information might “come to light during discovery,” the court 
held that the relators had stated a claim that was sufficient to survive the 
motion to dismiss.166 If other circuits follow suit, these concerns may be 
justified.167 
Although courts frequently consider materiality at similar stages in 
non-FCA litigation, it is not clear that implied certification cases will be 
equally amenable to resolution. A decision that implied certification al- 
legations must survive until more facts are developed will put enormous 
pressure on defendants to settle early, especially coupled with the in- 
creased FCA penalties that took effect in August 2016. With penalties 




164. The only entity with that information may prove to be the government itself. This may put an 
even higher premium on the government’s intervention decision, particularly the option of intervening 
and then moving to dismiss weak claims. See Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement, 
supra note 24 (discussing government’s role in qui tam suits). 
165. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir.   
2016). 
166. Id. See also United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sci., Inc., No. 15-16380, 2017 WL 2884047 
(9th Cir., July 7, 2017) (reversing dismissal of claims). 
167. In contrast, “courts need not opine in the abstract when the record offers insight into the 
Government’s actual payment decisions.” United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 
1027, 1032, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that the government had investigated the relator’s “allega-  
tions and did not disallow any charged costs.”). See also United States ex rel. Nargol, No. 16-1442 (1st 
Cir. July 26, 2017), slip op. at 12 (“the lack of any further action also shows that the FDA viewed the 
information, including that furnished by Relators, differently than Relators did.”); United States ex rel. 
Petratos, 855 F.3d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that relator “does not dispute that CMS would reim- 
burse these claims even with full knowledge of the alleged reporting deficiencies.”); D’Agostino v. ev3, 
Inc., 845 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2016) (“The fact that CMS has not  denied  reimbursement for Onyx in the  
wake of D’Agostino’s allegations casts serious doubt on the materiality of the fraudulent representa-  
tions . . . .”). But see Campie, 2017 WL 2884047 at *11 (“Although it may be that the government regu- 
larly pays this particular type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were 
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standably be hesitant to press their luck at trial.168 Settlement pressures 
may also be heightened by the 2015 “Yates Memorandum,” in which the 
DOJ vowed to pursue action against the individuals involved in corpo- 
rate wrongdoing as well as against the corporation itself.169 In the early 
stages of a highly fact-intensive implied certification suit, corporations 
may face difficult settlement decisions that potentially pit corporate in- 
terests against those of individual employees, officers, and directors. 
Ultimately, Escobar seems unlikely to increase the number of de- 
fendants willing and able to vet these issues more fully at trial. As I have 
argued previously, while settlement may satisfy the short-term goals of 
the parties, it also has the effect of precluding judicial oversight over the 
development of the law.170 An uptick in settlements may be good news 
for federal coffers, but bad news for the development of coherent FCA 
jurisprudence over the long term. More importantly, a Supreme Court 
opinion that fails to acknowledge this reality—or worse, posits an alter- 
nate reality in which trial courts dispose of these allegations with ease— 
will exacerbate rather than ameliorate longstanding FCA settlement 
pressures. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THINKING FORWARD 
So who “won” Escobar? In reality, everyone—and no one. While it 
comes as little surprise that the implied certification theory survived, fu- 
ture relators will be forced to litigate (or settle) under a far more de- 
manding materiality standard than the First Circuit applied. If Escobar 
ultimately proceeds to trial—admittedly a questionable proposition—the 
fact that Massachusetts regulators imposed fairly minimal penalties on 
the UHS providers, and apparently did not seek to suspend MassHealth 
payments, may loom large. UHS lost both of its major arguments, failing 
to convince the Court either to reject implied certification or to impose 
an explicit precondition-to-payment test, yet secured a materiality stand- 
ard with considerably more “bite” than prior cases had suggested. More- 
over, because Escobar’s formulation of materiality cannot be determined 
solely by looking to the wording of the statute or regulations alone, it will 
require courts to engage in more detailed scrutiny of the government’s 
procedures for paying claims—potentially leading courts to conclude that 
factual development beyond that available at the motion to dismiss or 
summary judgment stage is necessary, as the First Circuit did on remand. 
Perhaps the ultimate winner, then, will be the federal government, which 
 
 
168. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,491, 42,494 (June 30, 2016); 
28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2016). 
169. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. on Individual Accountabil-    
ity for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. 
170. Krause, supra note 18, at 202–10. See also Holt & Klass, supra note 25, at 42 (arguing that 
when FCA claims are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss, the end result is to increase the costs 





No. 5] FRAUD THAT COUNTS UNDER  THE FCA 1845 
 
will continue to reap the benefits of health care FCA settlements while 
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